918 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31
circumstances in which they are applied.16 Moreover, the report reveals that various federal programs have been ineffective in achieving their goals.17
The ACIR study also documents various grievances by state and local officials and others. For instance, one complaint is concerned with the inconsistency of program enforcement in federal spending programs.18 Quoting William G. Coleman,19 the report states that delegating enforcement power to each granting agency produces indescribable chaos for state and local governments.20 The ACIR further reports that once enforcement agencies tell the states what to do and how to do it, charges of unconstitutional intrusion into state affairs follow.21 When problems occur, however, the ACIR finds that the federal agencies try to avoid responsibility.22 These complaints reflect the concern of state and local officials that a bureaucratic centralization of authority has occurred in the federal government.23
A second consequence of centralization is that the constitutional guarantee to the states of a republican form of government may be compromised.24 In Baker, Justice O'Connor observes that the Court has a duty to protect this guarantee.25 As an example, she points out that by upholding the federal statute that subjects state and local bond instruments to federal taxation, the Court enabled Congress to devastate the ability of state and local governments to finance their operations.26 She notes that "the erosion of state authority is likely to occur a step at a time."27 Moreover, "[i]f there is any danger, it lies in the tyranny of small decisions - in the prospect that Congress will nibble away at state sovereignty, bit by bit, until someday essentially nothing is left but a gutted shell."28 As the authority of state and local officials diminishes, their motivation to resolve local problems may wane as may their opportunities for meaningful involvement in state and local government.29 Furthermore, centralization may reduce both the impact
17. Id. at 13.
18. Id. at 14.
19. Id. William G. Coleman is a government affairs consultant and a former ACIR executive director.
22. Id. at 16.
23. Id. at 15.
24. "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government." U.S. CONST. art. IV, Sec. 4. See also Baker, 108 S. Ct. at 1372 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
25. Baker, 108 S. Ct. at 1372 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
28. Id, (quoting L. Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 381 (2d ed. 1985)).
29. De Grazia, Federalism, THE CONSERVATIVE PAPERS 231-33 (1964).
Today the position of the states is vastly weaker. The scope, domain, and intensity of state actions relative to national governmental action have greatly diminished. Two basic causes are evident. Popular attention has turned away from the problems of the states, and without a public a rule is weak and undirected. Furthermore, a resignation of authority on the part of state officials is notable, not so much in particular cases and issues as in the lack of drive toward a better life within the state through using the numerous instrumentalities available to the state.
. . . .
. . . When . . . the legislators and the people are uninterested ... the whole apparatus of federalism can become antiquated and meaningless.