1989] AMPLIFYING THE TENTH AMENDMENT 921
have extensive influence in every state.50 The growth and power of federal regulatory agencies exemplifies the centralization of authority in the federal government as does the tendency of these agencies to expand their authority. This tendency suggests that the effective management and balancing of federal and state resources to avoid excessive centralization could be a significant problem and that an effective method of controlling the degree of centralization is therefore necessary.51 As Garcia and Baker demonstrate, the Court is unwilling to act as an ongoing mechanism to control the degree of centralization that is required for each regulatory area. The Court's unwillingness, however, merely reflects the idea that the judiciary is better suited to resolving disputes rather than acting as an ongoing control mechanism. On the other hand, the federal political process is well suited to act as a control mechanism and is, therefore, the proper vehicle to control the degree of centralization.52
The Framers provided two mechanisms to strike a balance in the federal political process. The first mechanism, the tenth amendment, declared a division of authority between the states and the federal government.53 The second mechanism, state appointment of United States senators, gave the states direct representation in Congress.54 The passage of the seventeenth amendment, however, not only eliminated the states' direct representation in Congress, but it also set the foundation for the evisceration of the tenth amendment.
THE DIVISION OF AUTHORITY BETWEEN THE STATES AND THE
Prior to the passage of the seventeenth amendment, the Supreme Court protected the states' interest by giving the tenth amendment specific meaning.55 The congressional records, however, reveal that Congress did not intend the tenth amendment to be a "yardstick" for measuring specific powers granted to the federal government or reserved to the states56 but rather a declaration of the relationship between the federal and state governments.57
fact that in 1987 the federal government spent approximately $626 billion in domestic spending and $100 billion in grants in aid to state governments).
50. REGULATORY REFORM, supra note 11, at 19-24 (a listing of 36 major federal statutes affecting state and local governments).
51. REGULATORY REFORM, supra note 11, at 208-15 (the centralization problem relates to procedural administration; as federal programs grew state officials found that they were sometimes not aware of new program regulations until their governments became subject to them).
52. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 552; REGULATORY REFORM, supra note 11, at 10-11.
53. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the People." U.S. CONST. AMEND. X. See also C. PRITCHETT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE FEDERAL SYSTEM at 57 (1984); THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, at 80-83 (A. Hamilton) (R. Fairfield, ed. 2d ed. 1966); and THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 161 (J. Madison) (R. Fairfield, ed. 2d ed. 1966).
54. "The Senate of the United States shall be . ... . chosen by the [state] legislature." U.S. CONST. ART I, Sec. 3; THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, at 182 (J. Madison) (R. Fairfield, ed. 2d ed. 1966).
55. REGULATORY REFORM, supra note 11, at 50. See also id. at 32-33.
56. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA at 1417 (1987) (referring to the Annals of Congress 767-68 (1789)).